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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to find out determinants which affect liquid 
asset ratio of Czech and Slovak commercial banks. The data cover the period 
from 2001 to 2010. We consider four bank specific factors and nine 
macroeconomic factors. Results of panel data regression analysis showed that 
although Czech Republic and Slovak Republic have a lot in common, different 
factors determined banks´ liquid assets in individual countries. The liquid asset 
ratio of Czech banks increases with increase of capital adequacy,  
with depreciation of Czech koruna and with worsening quality of credit portfolio. 
Liquidity of Slovak banks decreases with size of the bank, with higher capital 
adequacy, higher bank liquidity and during periods of financial crisis. Liquidity  
of Slovak banks is also positively related to economic cycle. 
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Introduction 
During global financial crisis, financial sector has gone through a dramatic  
re-appraisal of the liquidity risk. As a result of a continued drop in the market 
value of mortgage-backed securities from the subprime segment of the US 
market and the announcement of problems of some European banks,  
the interbank market came under extreme strain. This confidence crisis had  
the following consequences: (i) Amidst increased market nervousness, interbank 
interest rates sharply rose. (ii) Many segments of the structured credit  
and mortgage market ceased to trade at all, making it difficult to price 
outstanding positions. (iii) Investors sometimes failed to raise enough cash 
through asset sales. (iv) Interbank lending became scarce in a context of liquidity 
hoarding (Ewerhart and Valla, 2008). In response to the freezing up  
of the interbank market, the European Central Bank and U.S. Federal Reserve 
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injected billions in overnight credit into the interbank market. However, some 
banks needed extra liquidity supports (Orlowski, 2008). Even with extensive 
support, a number of banks failed, were forced into mergers or required 
resolution (BIS, 2009). 
It is evident that bank liquidity and liquidity risk is very up-to-date and important 
topic which should be of crucial importance of academicians and policymakers.  
The aim of this paper is therefore to find out determinants which affect liquid 
asset ratio (which we use as an indicator of bank liquidity) of Czech and Slovak 
commercial banks.  
The paper is structured as follows. Next section defines bank liquidity  
and characterizes methods of its measuring. Third section describes trends  
in liquid assets in Czech and Slovak banking sector. Following sections focus  
on the model and show results of regression analysis. Last section captures 
concluding remarks. 
Bank liquidity and its measuring 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS, 2008) defines liquidity as the ability  
of bank to fund increases in assets and meet obligations as they come due, 
without incurring unacceptable losses. Liquidity risk can arise on both sides  
of the balance sheet, if either the liquidity generated from selling or repo´ing 
assets or the liquidity available from various funding sources is insufficient  
to meet obligations as they fall due. In most cases a trigger event such  
as the crystallization of the market, credit or operational losses in the bank, 
damages of the bank´s reputation or market-wide liquidity stress, meets already 
existing vulnerability in a bank´s balance sheet and causes an adverse liquidity 
outcome (Matz and Neu, 2007). However, the most common source of bank 
vulnerability lies in liquidity mismatch between assets and liabilities – banks 
transform short-term deposits into long-term loans.  
Liquidity risk includes two types of risk: funding liquidity risk and market liquidity 
risk. Funding liquidity risk is the risk that the bank will not be able to meet 
efficiently both expected and unexpected current and future cash flow  
and collateral needs without affecting either daily operations or the financial 
condition of the firm. Market liquidity risk is the risk that a bank cannot easily 
offset or eliminate a position at the market price. According to Crockett (2008), 
the dimension of market liquidity risk includes market depth (the ability  
to execute large transactions without influencing prices unduly); tightness  
(the gap between bid and offer prices); intermediacy (the speed with which 
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transaction can be executed); and resilience (the speed with which underlying 
prices are restored after disturbance). Market liquidity risk and funding liquidity 
risk tend to reinforce each other: disruptions can easily spread from funding 
liquidity to market liquidity or vice versa (Baranyai, 2008).  
The first symptom of a liquidity crisis in the banking sector generally takes  
the form of a liquidity deficit in the balance sheet of a bank (Valla et al., 2008). 
BIS (2008) recommends  banks to identify alternative source of funding that 
strengthen its capacity to withstand a variety of severe yet plausible institution-
specific and market-wide liquidity shocks. Depending on the nature, severity  
and duration of the liquidity shock, potential sources of funding include  
the following:  
• deposit growth;  
• the lengthening of maturities of liabilities;  
• new issues of short- and long-term debt instruments;  
• intra-group fund transfers, new capital issues, the sale of subsidiaries  
or lines of business;  
• asset securitization;  
• the sale of highly liquid assets;  
• drawing-down committed facilities;  
• and borrowing from the central bank´s marginal lending facilities.  
However, not all of these options may be available in all circumstances and some 
may be available only with a substantial time delay. Bank management should 
regularly review and test its fund-raising options to evaluate their effectiveness at 
providing liquidity.  
Aspachs et al. (2005) divide these possibilities into three main mechanisms that 
banks can use to insure against liquidity crises: 
• Banks hold buffer of liquid assets on the asset side of the balance sheet.  
A large enough buffer of assets such as cash, balances with central banks 
and other banks, debt securities issued by governments and similar 
securities or reverse repo trades reduce the probability that liquidity 
demands threaten the viability of the bank. 
• Second strategy is connected with the liability side of the balance sheet. 
Banks can rely on the interbank market where they borrow from other 
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banks in case of liquidity demand. However, this strategy is strongly 
linked with market liquidity risk.  
• The last strategy concerns the liability side of the balance sheet, as well. 
The central bank typically acts as a Lender of Last Resort to provide 
emergency liquidity assistance to particular illiquid institutions and to 
provide aggregate liquidity in case of a system-wide shortage. 
Liquidity risk can be measured by two main methods: liquidity gap and liquidity 
ratios. The liquidity gap is the difference between assets and liabilities at both 
present and future dates. At any date, a positive gap between assets  
and liabilities is equivalent to a deficit (Bessis, 2009). 
Liquidity ratios are various balance sheet ratios which should identify main 
liquidity trends. These ratios reflect the fact that bank should be sure that 
appropriate, low-cost funding is available in a short time. This might involve 
holding a portfolio of assets than can be easily sold (cash reserves, minimum 
required reserves or government securities), holding significant volumes of stable 
liabilities (especially deposits from retail depositors) or maintaining credit lines 
with other financial institutions. Various authors like Moore (2010), Praet and 
Herzberg (2008) or Rychtárik (2009) provide various liquidity ratios: 
• Most common measure of liquidity risk is liquid asset ratio which is  
the share of liquid assets on total assets. This ratio should give us 
information about the general liquidity shock absorption capacity  
of a bank. As a general rule, the higher the ratio, the higher the capacity 
to absorb liquidity shock, given that market liquidity is the same for all 
banks in the sample. Nevertheless, high value of this ratio may be also 
interpreted as inefficiency. Since liquid assets yield lower income liquidity 
bears high opportunity costs for the bank. Therefore it is necessary to 
optimize the relation between liquidity and profitability. Moore (2010) 
notes that the liquid asset ratio has also its short-coming: it ignores  
the flow of funds from repayments, increases in liabilities and the demand 
for bank funds. 
• The share of liquid assets on deposits and short term borrowing – this 
ratio is more focused on the bank’s sensitivity to selected types of funding 
(deposits of households, enterprises, banks and other financial institutions 
and funds from debt securities issued by the bank); it should therefore 
capture the bank’s vulnerability related to these funding sources.  
The higher is the value of the ratio, the higher is the capacity to absorb 
liquidity shock. 
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• The share of liquid assets on deposits – this ratio is very similar  
to the previous one; however, it includes only deposits to households  
and enterprises. It measures the liquidity of a bank assuming that the 
bank cannot borrow from other banks in case of liquidity need. This is 
relatively strict measure of liquidity but it enables us to capture at least 
the part of the market liquidity risk. The bank is able to meet its 
obligations in terms of funding (the volume of liquid assets is high enough 
to cover volatile funding) if the value of this ratio is 100 % or more. 
Lower value indicates a bank’s increased sensitivity related to deposit 
withdrawals. 
• The share of loans on total assets – it indicates what percentage  
of the assets of the bank is tied up in illiquid loans; therefore the higher 
this ratio the less liquid the bank is. 
• The share of loans on deposits – it relates illiquid assets with liquid 
liabilities. Its interpretation is again: the higher this ratio the less liquid 
the bank is. Lower values of this ratio means that loans provide by the 
bank are financed by clients´ deposits. 
• The interbank ratio is computed as ratio of due from banks over due to 
banks. This ratio measures the position of a bank in the interbank market. 
If this ratio is greater than 100%, then it indicates that the bank is net 
lender (and thus probably more liquid). 
These liquidity ratios are still in common. It is possible to calculate them only on 
the basis of publicly available data from banks´ balance sheets and it is easy to 
interpret their values.  Their disadvantage is the fact that they do not always 
capture all, or any of liquidity risk. 
Trends in liquid asset ratio in Czech and Slovak banking 
sector 
First we will focus on development of liquid asset ratio of Czech and Slovak 
banks. We have used unconsolidated balance sheet data over the period  
from 2001 to 2010. As it can be seen from Table 1, the panel is unbalanced  
as some of banks do not report over the whole period of time.  
The sample includes significant parts of both banking sectors (not only by number 
of banks but mainly by their share on total banking assets). Nevertheless,  
the share of observed bank on total assets may appear to be quite low. Partly it is 
a consequence of role of branches of foreign banks; partly it is because we do not 
include data from building societies, mortgage banks and from specialized banks 
like Českomoravská záruční a rozvojová banka, Slovenská záručná a rozvojová 
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banka, Česká exportní banka or Exim banka which focus on very special financial 
products and services. 
Table 1 Total number of banks and observed banks 
 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 
Czech Republic 
Total number of banks 21 22 20 20 18 18 17 16 16 17 
No. of observed banks 15 16 16 16 16 13 13 12 12 13 
Share of observed banks  
on total assets (in %) 
68 74 74 74 72 74 75 66 67 68 
Slovakia 
Total number of banks 16 15 15 15 15 14 13 14 13 12 
No. of observed banks 12 12 12 13 14 12 12 12 10 10 
Share of observed banks  
on total assets (in %) 
56 52 56 59 65 62 65 70 66 65 
Source: author´s processing 
For these banks, we calculated liquid asset ratio. We include cash, government 
bonds, short-term claims on other banks and securities from trading portfolio  
in liquid assets. Figure 1 shows the development of liquid asset ratio of Czech and 
Slovak banks. It is evident that liquidity of Czech banks has declined during last 
ten years. On the contrary, during the period 2001–2008, value of the ratio  
for Slovak banks fluctuated only slightly. About one-third of assets of Slovak 
banks were liquid assets. 
In both countries, we can see negative impact of financial crisis on bank liquidity. 
However, the extent of the impact differs among countries. Czech banks were 
least liquid in 2009 but there has been some improvement in last year. The fall  
of liquidity of Slovak banks in 2009 has been followed by an even deeper decline 
in 2010. The volume of banks´ liquid assets decreased mainly as a result  
of reduction of interbank transaction in the respective years. This could be  
a signal of market liquidity risk – the interbank market has frozen because 
individual banks have not trust to each other. 
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Figure 1 Liquid asset ratio of Czech and Slovak banks 
Source: author´s calculation 
The model 
In order to identify determinants which affect liquid assets of Czech and Slovak 
commercial banks we use panel data regression analysis (Equation 1).  
itiitit
XLAR εδβα ++⋅+= ´      (1) 
Where 
it
LAR is the liquid asset ratio for bank i in time t, 
it
X is vector  
of explanatory variables for bank i in time t, α is constant, ´β is coefficient which 
represents the slope of variables, 
i
δ  represents fixed effects in bank i, and 
it
ε  
means the error term.  
It is evident that the most important task is to choose the appropriate 
explanatory variables. Although liquidity problems of some banks during global 
financial crisis re-emphasized the fact that liquidity is very important  
for functioning of financial markets and the banking sector, an important gap still 
exists in the empirical literature about liquidity and its measuring. Only few 
studies aim to identify determinants of liquidity.  
Aspachs et al. (2005) study bank-specific and macroeconomic determinants  
of liquidity of 57 UK-resident banks, on data on a quarterly basis over the period 
from 1985Q1 to 2003Q4. They have found that the liquidity ratio is a function  
of: 
• probability of obtaining the support from lender of last resort in case  
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• short term interest rate which captures the monetary policy effect  
(the negative regression coefficient signals that when policy rates are 
high banks respond by holding a smaller amount of liquid assets);  
• growth rate of gross domestic product (banks hold smaller amount  
of liquidity in periods of stronger economic growth);  
• and interest margin as a measure of opportunity costs of holding liquid 
assets which has a negative impact on liquidity holdings.  
For foreign owned banks, support from lender of last resort does not appear to 
affect their holding of liquid assets. When it comes to short term interest rate  
and growth rate of gross domestic product, these variables are statistically 
significant, too, but their effect on bank liquidity is smaller. Interest margin 
affects liquidity of foreign owned banks positively. Bank profitability; loan growth 
where higher loan growth should signal increase in illiquid assets and size  
of the bank are not statistically significant.   
Determinants of liquidity risk of 1107 banks from 36 emerging economies  
in period 1995-2000 are analyzed by Bunda and Desquilbet (2008). Their main 
aim was to explore how the liquidity of commercial banks is affected by  
the exchange rate regime of the country in which they operate. They have found 
that in extreme regimes at both ends of the line (i.e. pure floating at one end  
and currency board and dollarized economies at the other end) banks are more 
liquid than in intermediate regimes. However, they focus also on other 
determinants both on macroeconomic and bank-specific level. According to their 
results, bank liquidity is positively influenced by: 
• capital adequacy (higher capital adequacy is concomitant with higher 
liquidity);  
• lending interest rate which is consistent with the credit rationing 
phenomenon;  
• and the share of public expenditures on gross domestic product which 
measures supply of relatively liquid assets.  
On the contrary, impact of financial crisis (which is very often caused  
by poor bank liquidity) is negative. The results show that the introduction  
of prudential regulation increases confidence in the banking sector so that banks 
can collect more deposits, thus increasing liquid liabilities, while, at the same time 
but to a lesser extent, investing more in illiquid projects.  
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The empirical analysis of the hypothesis that interest rates affect banks’ risk 
taking and the decision to hold liquidity across European countries provides 
Lucchetta (2007). The analysis is based on data of 5066 European banks over the 
period from 1998 to 2004. The study came to conclusion that across European 
countries, the interbank interest rate positively affects the liquidity retained by 
banks and the decision of a bank to be a lender in the interbank market. The key 
variable which affects the decision to lend in the interbank market is the liquidity 
price which depends on the demand and supply of liquidity and on the risk-free 
interest rate. The increase of this price increases the liquidity supply and thereby 
the lending in the interbank market. As this new liquidity is invested by borrowers 
in risky loans, the rise in risk-free interest rate increases banks´ risk-taking 
behaviour (which is measured by the share of loans on total assets and share  
of loan loss provisions on net interest revenues). The results also showed that 
bank size matters: the lender banks tend to be smaller than borrower ones.  
The relation between monetary policy interest rate and the decision of a bank  
to hold liquidity and to lend in the interbank market is negative.  
The effects of the financial crisis on the liquidity of commercial banks in Latin 
America and Caribbean countries investigated Moore (2010). The results based  
on monthly observations over the period January 1970 to December 2004 show 
that liquidity tends to be inversely related to the business cycle in half  
of the countries studied; and to the volatility of the cash-to-deposit ratio as well 
(which indicates that commercial banks tend to expand liquidity when  
the volatility of cash demand by the public rises). The effect of money market 
interest rate as a measure of opportunity costs of holding liquidity is mixed:  
the coefficient is positive in some countries and negative in some other countries 
(mainly in countries with relatively high interest rates). The relation between 
financial crisis and bank liquidity is also mixed: in six out of the nine countries, 
banks were less liquid during the crisis. This concerns in particular countries 
where there was a lending boom before the crisis or where banks were subject  
to large deposit withdrawals during the crisis. In other three countries, banks 
were more liquid during the crisis. In most of these countries the banking crisis 
was accompanied by an exchange rate crisis that probably led banks to be more 
conservative in their liquidity policies. However, such bank behavior can deeper 
the crisis if companies cannot access credits to finance their operations.     
Liquidity created by all 457 German state-owned savings banks and its 
determinants in period from 1997 to 2006 has been analyzed by Rauch et al. 
(2010). According to this study, bank liquidity is determined by macroeconomic 
factors; mainly by:  
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• monetary policy interest rate which has highly significant negative 
influence on bank liquidity (i.e. tightening monetary policy reduces bank 
liquidity);  
• and level of unemployment which is connected with demand for loans  
and can also act as a proxy for general health of the economy and  
the negative influence means – the  negative influence which has been 
proved indicate that the healthier the economy is, i.e. the lower  
the unemployment rate, the more liquidity is created by banks.  
They do not find any bank specific factors, such as bank profitability or size  
of the bank measured by total number of bank customers, to have any influence 
on liquidity creation. Also the savings quota which should indicate the deposit 
behavior of private clients is not statistically significant.  
Entirely unique is the approach of Fielding and Shortland (2005). Except  
of common determinants, they investigate the impact of violent political incidents 
arising from conflict between radical Islamic group and the Egyptian state. Based 
on data for the period 1983-1996, they have found that bank liquidity: 
• is pro-cyclical (the level of economic output is taken into account by 
logarithm of real gross domestic product);  
• responds positively also to increases in the discount rate (although this 
response seems only to be temporary); 
• is positively related to the degree of macroeconomic instability which is 
captured by the rate of depreciation of the black market exchange rate; 
• and negatively related to economic reforms which lead to reduction  
of excess liquidity. 
However, the most important factor which impact on bank liquidity is number  
of violent political incidents: banks hold excessive liquid reserves in periods  
of political instability.      
Cornet et al. (2011) study how banks managed the liquidity shock that occurred 
during the financial crisis of 2007-2009 by adjusting their holdings of cash  
and other liquid assets and how these efforts affected credit availability. Their 
sample included quarterly data of all US commercial banks over the period 
2006Q1 through 2009Q2. They estimated regression function separately for small 
and large banks with following explanatory variables:  
• the share of illiquid assets (such as loans, leases, asset-backed securities, 
mortgage-backed securities) on total assets;  
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• the share of core deposits (i.e. deposits under USD 100 000 plus all 
transactions deposits) on total assets;  
• bank capital adequacy; 
• and the ratio of unused commitments to commitments plus assets.  
They came to conclusion that during the crisis, liquidity risk exposure led to 
greater increases in liquid assets, mirrored by greater decreases in credit 
origination. In other words, banks with more illiquid asset portfolios increased 
their holdings of liquid assets and decreased lending. The results showed 
significant differences between small and large banks. Mainly small banks that 
relied more heavily on stable sources of financing, i.e. core deposits and capital, 
continued to lend relative to other banks. Moreover, large banks have higher 
share of illiquid assets on total assets than small banks and also hold a greater 
fraction of unused commitments. Large banks are more exposed to liquidity risk 
than small banks across four dimensions: more undrawn commitments, less 
capital, less reliance on core deposits and lower liquidity of balance sheet assets.  
Off-balance sheet liquidity risk materialized as borrowers drew on pre-existing 
commitments in large quantities.  
The selection of variables was based on above cited relevant studies.  
We considered whether the use of the particular variable makes economical sense 
in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. For this reason, we excluded  
from the analysis variables such as political incidents. We also considered  
which other factors could influence the behavior of banks in the interbank  
market. The limiting factor then was the availability of some data. Table 2  
shows a list of variables which we have used in regression analysis. 
We consider four bank specific factors and nine macroeconomic factors. As it can 
be seen from Table 2, we expect that three factors could have positive impact  
on bank liquidity, the rest of factors are expected to have negative impact  
on bank liquidity. Macroeconomic data were provided by International Financial 
Statistics of International Monetary Fund (IMF). Data about average exchange 
rates were provided by Oanda Corporation. Bank specific data were obtained  
from unconsolidated balance sheet and profit and loss data of banks´ annual 
reports. 
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Table 2 Variables definition 
Variable Source Est.eff. 

















FIC: dummy variable for financial crisis  
(1 in 2009, 0 in rest of the period) 
own - 
GDP: growth rate of gross domestic product  
(GDP volume % change) 
IMF +/- 
INF: inflation rate (CPI % change) IMF + 
IRB: interest rate on interbank transactions IMF + 
IRL: interest rate on loans IMF - 
IRM: difference between interest rate on loans   
and interest rate on deposits 
IMF - 
MIR: monetary policy interest rate IMF - 
UNE: unemployment rate IMF - 
EUR: exchange rate CZK(SKK)/EUR (yearly average)  Oanda +/- 
Source: author´s processing 
Results 
We used an econometric package EViews 7. After tests of stationarity, normality 
and multicollinearity, we proceed with regression estimation. We estimated 
Equation 1 separately for each country. First we included all explanatory variables 
which might have an effect on the dependent variable. To reduce number  
of explanatory variables, we used information criteria (Akaike, Schwarz  
and Hannan-Quinn). The aim was to find a regression model with high value  
of adjusted coefficient of determination in which all the variables involved are 
statistically significant. 
Table 3 shows the results of the best estimation for Czech banks. The explanatory 
power of this model is quite high. The positive influence of the share of capital  
on total assets is consistent with the assumption that bank with sufficient capital 
adequacy should be liquid, too. The positive coefficient of exchange rate CZK/EUR 
signals that the depreciation of Czech koruna leads to higher liquid asset ratio.  
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A substantial part of liquid assets creates interbank transactions. Czech banking 
sector is a net lender in interbank market (CNB, 2010); it is therefore highly 
probable that at least some Czech banks lend also to foreign bank.  
The profitability of such transactions increases with domestic currency 
depreciation. Therefore, the depreciation of Czech koruna can stimulate banks  
to focus more on international interbank transaction and thus increase their level 
of liquid assets. 
Table 3 Determinants of liquid asset ratio in the Czech Republic 
Variable Coefficient Standard deviation 
Constant -48.70093* 10.45872 
CAP 0.348195* 0.102729 
EUR 2.577218* 0.359676 
NPL 0.463845** 0.178999 
Adjusted R2 0.738822 
Durbin-Watson stat. 1.753026 
Total observation 141 
Source: author´s calculation 
Note: The starred coefficient estimates are significant at the 1% (*), 5% (**) or 10% (***) 
level. 
Although we estimated negative influence of non-performing loans, results of the 
analysis show the opposite effect. This could be a sign of prudent policy of banks: 
they offset the higher credit risk with cautious liquidity risk management. 
Determinants of liquid assets of Slovak banks can be found in Table 4. The liquid 
asset ratio is determined by size of the bank, bank capital adequacy, profitability, 
growth rate of gross domestic product in previous year and by realization  
of financial crisis. The explanatory power of the model is slightly lower. 
Table 4 Determinants of liquid asset ratio in the Slovak Republic 
Variable Coefficient Standard deviation 
Constant 204.0059* 48.05892 
TOA -11.76977* 3.147000 
CAP -1.176136** 0.530005 
ROE -0.104788*** 0.054010 
GDP(-1) 1.127757* 0.239350 
FIC -12.20791* 3.276971 
Adjusted R2 0.546390 
Durbin-Watson stat. 2.041361 
Total observation 105 
Source: author´s calculation 
Note: The starred coefficient estimates are significant at the 1% (*), 5% (**) or 10% (***) 
level. 
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According to our findings, small banks are more liquid than big banks. This finding 
fully corresponds to the well-known “too big to fail” hypothesis. If big banks are 
seeing themselves as “too big to fail”, their motivation to hold liquid assets is 
limited. In case of a liquidity shortage, they rely on a liquidity assistance  
of Lender of Last Resort. 
Although we expected that the bank with sufficient capital adequacy should be 
liquid, too, the results of the regression show the opposite influence of the share 
of capital on total assets. It seems that bank with lower capital adequacy pay 
more attention to liquidity risk management and hold a sufficient buffer of liquid 
assets. 
The negative influence of bank profitability measured by return on equity is 
consistent with standard finance theory which emphasizes the negative 
correlation of liquidity and profitability. 
Although most studies assumed the negative link between business cycle  
and bank liquidity, the results show that the approach of Moore (2010) can be 
applied on Slovak banking sector. Positive sign of the coefficient signals that 
cyclical downturn should lower banks' expected transactions demand for money 
and therefore lead to decreased liquidity. Moreover, during expansionary phases, 
companies (which have higher profits) and households (which have higher 
income) might prefer to rely more on internal sources of finance and reduce  
the relative proportion of external financing and might reduce their debt levels.  
In recessions, households and corporations may increase their demand for bank 
credit in order to smooth out the impact of lower income and profits. Growth rate 
of gross domestic product is statistically significant with one year lag which is 
consistent with the fact that companies and households need some time  
for accumulating profits and savings and therefore it takes some time for changes 
to be reflected in banks´ liquidity. 
The negative impact of financial crisis has been mentioned above. Financial crisis 
could be caused by poor bank liquidity. However, the effect may be the opposite: 
financial crisis lead to poor bank liquidity. Financial crisis affects banks in two 
different ways. First, the volatility of important macroeconomic variables 
influences unfavorably the business environment of banks. Second, the instability 
deteriorates the business environment of borrowers; it can worsen their ability to 
repay the loans which can lead to a decline in bank liquidity. The impact  
of financial crisis is also consistent with impact of previous variable (growth rate 
of gross domestic product). 




The aim of this paper was to find out determinants which affect liquid assets  
of Czech and Slovak commercial banks. Initially, we have focused  
on development of liquid asset ratio. Liquidity of Czech banks has declined during 
last ten years. On the contrary, liquidity of Slovak banks fluctuated only slightly 
during the period 2001–2008. Bank liquidity has fallen due to the financial crisis 
in both countries. However, the extent of the impact differs: Czech banks were 
least liquid in 2009 but there has been some improvement in last year; the fall  
of liquidity of Slovak banks in 2009 has been followed by an even deeper decline 
in 2010.  
Furthermore, we focus on determinants of liquid asset ratio. Results of panel data 
regression analysis showed that the liquid asset ratio is determined mostly  
by different factors in each country (only capital adequacy matters in both 
countries but with different impact).  
The liquid asset ratio of Czech banks increases with increase of capital adequacy, 
with depreciation of Czech koruna (which stimulates banks to focus more  
on international transaction in interbank market) and surprisingly with worsening 
quality of credit portfolio (banks offset higher credit risk by more prudent liquidity 
risk management).  
Liquidity of Slovak banks is determined by size of the bank (small banks are more 
liquid); bank capital adequacy (banks with lower capital adequacy hold higher 
buffer of liquid assets), bank profitability (which is negatively correlated with 
liquidity), growth rate of gross domestic product in previous year (which is 
positively related to bank liquidity) and by realization of financial crisis (where 
realization of financial crisis worsen bank liquidity). 
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